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Abstract 
There are considerable number of approaches to 
policy specification both for security management 
and policy driven network management purposes as 
reported in [20]. This specification sort security 
policies into two basic types: authorization and 
obligation policies. Most of the researches in 
security policies specification over the years focus 
on authorization policy modelling. In this paper, we 
report our approach in the design and Modelling of 
obligation Policy as delegation in information 
security by considering separation of duty and trust 
as pre-requisite conditions for delegation. The 
formal structures of the Delegation models 
developed was adapted from the Mathematical 
structures of Separation of duty (both Static and 
Dynamic SoD) in RBAC environment as described 
in [8] and [16]. Three factors of Properties, 
Experiences and Recommendation as described in 
[22] were used for the Trust Modelling. Future 
works proposed include the development of a 
formal model for revocation after delegation and 
integration of appropriate authorization policy with 
the model. 
 
1. Introduction 
Separation of Duty (SoD) is widely recognized as a 
fundamental principle in computer security [5], 
[19]. In its simplest form, the principle states that a 
sensitive task should be performed by two or more 
different users acting in cooperation. The concept 
of SoD has long existed before the information age; 
it has been widely used in, for example, the banking 
industry and the military, sometimes under the 
name “the two-man rule” [16]. More generally, an 
SoD policy requires the cooperation of at least n 
different users to complete the task. SoD has been 
identified as a high-level mechanism that is “at the 
heart of fraud and error control” [5, 8]. An SoD 
policy is a high-level policy in the sense that it does 
not restrict which users are allowed to carry out the 
individual steps in a sensitive task, but rather states 
an overall requirement that must be satisfied by any 
set of users that together complete a task [16]. 
[8] viewed SoD as an application-design principle 
based on three well-understood design and 
implementation steps given as integrity property 
definition, application design and user assignment 
to application partitions. Users of different skills or 
interests are assigned to operate in different 
application partitions. These assignments may last 
for limited periods of time, and may change 
dynamically. Therefore, users’ collusion to 
perpetrate fraud will be checked or at least 
controlled to the minimal.  
According to [10] and [21] and as stated in [8] 
despite the importance of SoD as a security 
principle and its well-understood application in 
business, industry, and government; few computer 
systems have supported SoD as a security policy to 
date.  
The lack of wide-spread support was attributed by 
[8] to three separate reasons. First, SoD is an 
inherently application-oriented policy and, thus, 
has been perceived to yield limited payoff for 
operating systems and networks. Secondly, when 
the SoD principle is interpreted within different 
applications, it may yield many different SoD 
policies [21] and recurrent administrative costs. 
Third, most SoD policies proposed to date have 
been only informally defined and, therefore, subject 
to ambiguous or incomplete specifications, and 
limited assurance.  
Therefore, it is believe that the incorporation of 
SoD into Role Based Access Control Model 
(RBAC) to support Role Delegation will address 
this lack of widespread support as reported in [8]. 
Since a system must not only support authorization, 
but must also enable active entities to securely 
delegate their roles without breaching security 
policies. 
 
2. Trust 
[22] define trust as a relationship between a truster 
and a trustee and it is dependent on a given task. 
The truster’s trust for a trustee, with respect to a 
given task, depends on several factors namely, 
properties, experiences and recommendation. 
Properties are verifiable characteristics of the 
trustee. Experiences correspond to the past work 
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experience of the trustee and it reflect past 
interactions that the truster had with the trustee. 
Recommendations are the information that the 
truster obtains from third parties whom the truster 
trust about the capabilities of the trustee. How to 
quantify these factors and assess the trustworthiness 
of an entity before designating him as the delegate 
has also been described in [22]. Trust modelling has 
been reported in [11] and [13] where it was claimed 
that trust is a relationship between two entities on a 
specific statement and is represented using degrees 
of belief b, disbelief d and uncertainty U.  
In [11] and [13], subjective logic was utilized to 
define recommendation and consensus formulae in 
order to take into account multiple subjective views 
on the same statement.  In [12], a new component 
base rate a, was added where a [0,1]. In [14], how 
to specify trust networks consisting of multiple 
paths between the trusted parties and provide a 
practical method for analyzing and deriving 
measures of trust in such environments were 
shown. 
[4] proposed a Trust based Access Control 
(TrustBAC) model where the assignment of users 
to roles depended on their trust value -1 to 1. While 
in [15]; a trust model where the notion of trust 
contexts was formalized was designed.  
 
3. Structure of Separation of Duty Policy In 
RBAC For Delegation Policy Modelling. 
In [8], security policies were viewed as composition 
of security properties. The notion of dependency 
among policy properties were illustrated by them 
by considering three types of properties: access-
attribute (AT), access-authorization (AA) and 
access-management (AM).  
Access attributes include subject and object 
attributes (e.g., user, group, role, location 
identifiers, secrecy and integrity levels, time-of-
access intervals), and AT properties typically 
establish invariant relationships among attributes 
(e.g., lattices of secrecy and integrity levels, user-
group membership invariants, inheritance of role 
permissions). AA properties determine whether a 
subject’s current access attributes satisfy the 
conditions for accessing an object given the current 
object attributes.  
Formally, [8] described a simple structure of SoD in 
RBAC as a security policy P as follows: 
 
𝒫 = P ∧  𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃)    
Where P = AT ∧  AA ∧  AM.  
The property P itself may have other properties in 
addition to 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃); for example, application – 
oriented policies such as SoD, also include 
property𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡(P, 𝐴𝑝𝑝). They specify SoD policy 
as incremental conjunctions of properties to RBAC 
policies. That is; 
𝑆𝑜𝐷 − 𝒫 = 𝑆𝑜𝐷 − P ∧  𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝐷 − 𝑃 ∧
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝐷 − P, 𝐴𝑝𝑝 ∧ 𝑹𝑩𝑨𝑪 − 𝓟Where 
𝑹𝑩𝑨𝑪 − 𝓟 = RBAC − P ∧ 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(RBAC − P),  
and both 
𝑆𝑜𝐷 − 𝒫 and RBAC − P are conjunctions of AT, 
AM, and AA properties. 
 
[8] further defined the types, functions and 
properties of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
system that are necessary to define SoD properties. 
They considered RBAC system to be defined by a 
state machine model. They denote set of system 
states by STATES, the set of subjects by 
SUBJECTS, the set of users by USERS, the set of 
operations by OPERATIONS, and the set of object 
by OBJECTS. A RBAC system is characterized by 
the fact that a user’s membership to a “role” and by 
the roles’ permissions to perform operations on 
those objects. Hence, a role is a collection of 
operations on object sets. 
 The class of roles, ROLES, is a subset of 
2𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑋 2
𝑂𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆
. 
The function 
𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑕: 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑋𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑋𝑂𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 ⟶
2𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 Defines the operations allowed to each 
role in each state of the system: 
∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆, ∀𝑜𝑝 ∈ 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 , ∀𝑟
∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑆, ∀𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝑂𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆, 𝑜𝑝
∈ 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑕 𝑠, 𝑟, 𝑜𝑏𝑗 ⟺ ∃𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑠𝑒𝑡
⊆ 𝑂𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆: 𝑜𝑏𝑗
∈ 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∧ (𝑜𝑝, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑠𝑒𝑡) ∈ 𝑟 
The function 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠: 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑆 ⟶ 2𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆  
defines the users assigned to a given role. 
The function 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟: 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 ⟶
𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆 returns the user associated with the subject. 
The function 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠: 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐽𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 ⟶ 2𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆  
returns the roles assumed by a user in a given state 
while executing a given subject. These roles must 
have been assigned to the subject’s user. 
The function 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑡: 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑋𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆 ⟶ 2𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆  is 
defined as follows: 
∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆, ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆, 
 
If 𝑟 ∈ 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑡(𝑠, 𝑢),then we say that role 
r is enabled or active for the user u in state s 
 
4. Access Obligation Formalization 
As an extension and a refinement to the above as 
well as the three properties (AT, AM and AA), we 
introduced access – obligation (AO) as the fourth 
requirement which is a property that defines 
obligation policy that we shall modelled as 
delegation requirement. AO properties determine 
whether a subject’s current role based on attributes 
and role hierarchy satisfy the conditions for 
delegating that role to another subject in accessing 
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the same object given the current object attributes 
without breaching security policy. 
Therefore, we extend the model described in [8] to 
incorporate delegation (obligation policy) by 
modelling Access Obligation which is formalized 
as follows; 
 
𝒫 = P ∧ AO ∧  𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃)  
      
To formalize Access – Obligation (AO), consider 
an Access Control system that is characterized by 
the fact that a subject’s right to access object are 
defined by subject’s attributes, membership to 
“role” and roles’ permissions to perform operations 
on the object. Hence, a role is a collection of secure 
operations on object sets.  
Therefore;  
∀ 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽, ∀ 𝑜𝑝 ∈ 𝑂𝑃, ∀ 𝑟𝑜𝑙 ∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿, 
∀ 𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝑂𝐵𝐽,  
Where 𝑆𝑏𝑗, 𝑂𝑏𝑗, 𝑜𝑝, 𝑟𝑜𝑙 are Subject, Object, 
Operation and Roles respectively. 
 Then, Access Obligation is a function modelled as 
follows, 
𝐴𝑂: 𝑜𝑝 ∈ 𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 , 𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝑜𝑏𝑗) ⟺
∃ 𝑂𝑏𝑗 ⊆ 𝑂𝐵𝐽: 𝑟𝑜𝑙 ∈
 𝑅𝑂𝐿 ∧ (𝑜𝑝, 𝑜𝑏𝑗, 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) ∈ 𝑟𝑜𝑙  
     
The equations above therefore define the function; 
Access-Obligation (Obligation Policy) as an 
extension to SoD structure defined in [8]. 
Varieties of SoD properties and their relationship in 
secure RBAC systems and their composition based 
on property conjunctions have been defined. In [21], 
Static and Dynamic SoD properties were 
distinguished. [6] defined Static SoD (SSoD) by the 
rule that “each user must be permitted to use only 
certain transaction”. Their work was formalized by 
[8] in RBAC environment as follows. 
Let 𝐴𝑝𝑝 be an application and 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡 its assigned 
roles in a secure RBAC system. 𝜎 ∈  0  satisfies 
the SSoD property with respect to 𝐴𝑝𝑝 if any two 
distinct roles in 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡 do not have common 
members. Such roles are said to be restricted. 
Formally, 
𝜎 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐷(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡, 𝐴𝑝𝑝) ⟺ 
 ∀ 𝑟1,𝑟2 ∈ 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡, 𝑟1 ≠  𝑟2⟹ 
𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑟1) ∩ 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑟2) = ∅
     
We developed a stronger version of this model 
below to incorporate delegation policy by adding 
the delegation requirements – (AO: can_delegate) – 
modelled above that the target object of the two 
roles be disjoint. Delegation in Static Separation of 
Duty (SSoD) rules state that delegation of role 
cannot take place between subjects (even if they 
have the same or share similar attributes) and 
belong to different role hierarchies; if the subjects 
have distinct roles, do not have common members 
and are not authorized to perform operations on the 
same object with an application. For instance, Two 
Accountants (SUBJECTS) that are Professional 
(the same ATTRIBUTE) on employment in a bank 
must occupy two distinct positions; which could be 
an auditor (ROLE1) or an accountant (ROLE2) and 
they will be performing different functions 
(OBJECTS).  
Let 𝐴𝑝𝑝 = [𝑂𝐵𝐽, 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒] 
and  
∀ 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽, ∀ 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘  ∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿,  
∀ 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑘  ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽_𝐴𝑇𝑅,  
∀ 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘  ∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑅 
if 
[𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖(𝑠𝑏𝑗𝑖) = 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑘(𝑠𝑏𝑗𝑘)] ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽_𝐴𝑇𝑅, 
and  
[𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖) ≠ 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘)]
∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑅, 
Then 
𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖) ∩ 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘)
= ∅ 
∧ 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖)  
𝑆𝑏𝑗 _𝑎𝑡𝑟 𝑖 ,𝑆𝑏𝑗 _𝑎𝑡𝑟 𝑘∈𝑆𝐵𝐽 _𝐴𝑇𝑅
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘)
= ∅ 
Therefore, Delegation with Static SoD is 
formalized as the function stated as follows; 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐷 𝐷𝑙𝑔 : |{𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈
𝑂𝐵𝐽|𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖 , 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑖) ∩ 𝐴𝑝𝑝 ≠
 ∅} ∩
𝑅𝑜𝑙 𝑖 ,𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘  ∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿
 {𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈
𝑂𝐵𝐽|𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘 , 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑘) ∩ 𝐴𝑝𝑝 ≠
∅} = ∅   
In [17], object based dynamic SoD was introduced 
as a more flexible and realistic alternative to the 
Static SoD. However, their informal definitions 
[17] [21], does not specify precisely which objects, 
operations and roles are subjected to the Dynamic 
SoD (DSoD) condition.  
Delegation in DSoD rule state that delegation of 
role may not take place between subjects (even if 
they have the same or share similar attributes) and 
belong to same role hierarchies; if the subjects have 
distinct roles, may have common members and but 
are not authorized to perform operations on the 
same object within an application at the same time. 
For instance, A professor (SUBJECT) that is 
presenting a student for oral examination 
(OBJECT) as thesis supervisor 
(CURRENT_ROLE(i)) cannot stand as both the 
internal examiner (CURRENT_ROLE(i)) as well as 
external examiner (CURRENT_ROLE(k)) even 
though he is qualified to occupy both position by 
virtue of his qualifications (ATTRIBUTES). The 
same professor may later occupy an external 
examiner’s position (CURRENT_ROLE(k)) in 
another forum where he will not be internal 
examiner (CURRENT_ROLE(i)) but all acting on 
the same OBJECT (which is examination).  
Let 𝐴𝑝𝑝 = [𝑂𝐵𝐽, 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒] 
and  
∀ 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽,  
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∀ 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘  ∈ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙,  
∀ 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑘  ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽_𝐴𝑇𝑅,  
∀ 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘  ∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑅 
if 
[𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖(𝑠𝑏𝑗𝑖) = 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑘(𝑠𝑏𝑗𝑘)] ∈ 𝑆𝐵𝐽_𝐴𝑇𝑅,  
and  
[𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖) = 𝑅𝑜𝑙_𝑕𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘 (𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘)]
∈ 𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑅, 
Then 
𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖) ∩ 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘)
≠ ∅ ∧ 
 
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , (𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖) 
∩
𝑆𝑏𝑗 _𝑎𝑡𝑟 𝑖 ,𝑆𝑏𝑗 _𝑎𝑡𝑟 𝑘  ∈𝑆𝐵𝐽 _𝐴𝑇𝑅
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘) ≠
∅Therefore, Delegation with Dynamic SoD is the 
function modelled as follows;  
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷 𝐷𝑙𝑔 : |{𝑜𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝑂𝐵𝐽|𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 
(𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 , 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑙 𝑖), 𝑜𝑏𝑗) ∩ 𝐴𝑝𝑝
≠  ∅}
∩
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖 , 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘  ∈  𝑅𝑂𝐿
 {𝑜𝑏𝑗
∈ 𝑂𝐵𝐽|𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 , 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 
(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑘), 𝑜𝑏𝑗) ∩ 𝐴𝑝𝑝 ≠ ∅} = ∅ 
  
5. Modelling Trust in Delegation Policy  
Having considered various research works that have 
been done in delegation and separation of duties, 
and developing models that refined and formalize 
the basis on which a delegator selects a delegatee to 
ensure secure delegation of roles from one subject 
to another, and without breaching the information 
security policy; we model trust as an extension of 
the already designed delegation model based on 
SoD as another pre-requisite condition for 
delegation.  
The work of [22] was refined from the tasks chain 
to roles and subject attributes chain and is 
formalized as follows for each of the three criteria 
defined. 
 
5.1 Formalizing “Properties” In Trust 
Modelling For Delegation Policy. 
Basically, properties depend on the attributes of the 
subjects which are the requirements for a subject to 
delegate his role(s) to another subject. For example, 
the role of performing surgery requires the subject 
to be a certified surgeon. In a more details format, 
the surgeon has to be a specialist in a particular 
aspect of surgery (for instance, ENT, gynaecologist, 
Neuro Surgery e.t.c). Therefore, an ENT cannot 
delegate his role to a gynaecologist based on the 
difference in the area of specialization (attributes) 
notwithstanding that both of them are surgeons. 
Specific examples can be qualifications and areas 
of specialization of the subjects which can be 
quantified or weighted to evaluate the attributes 
value. 
We formally defined structure of properties based 
on trust as follows: 
Let the attributes needed for 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖  to delegate his 
role 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  to 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  be defined as follows: 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑖 =  𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑖1, 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑖2, … , … , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛   
Then if 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑘 ≠  ∅  
and 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑘 ≠  ∅ =  𝑃  
Then  
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                              𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
else 
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                                      𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
To assign weight to the attributes value(s), the 
intersecting elements will be quantified and 
weighted values will be assigned to each element. 
The computation of the overall sum of the weights 
give the relative trust based on a set standard of the 
security framework. 
To formalized the above, 
Let the weight assigned to each element of the 
attributes set be defined as follows: 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖
=  𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖1, 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖2, … , … , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑛   
Then from equation above,  
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                              𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  if the structure 
stated as follows is computed to be true and cannot 
delegate otherwise. 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑘 =  𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐴𝑡𝑟_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
≥  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖    
where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
 
5.2 Formalizing “Experience” In Trust 
Modelling For Delegation Policy. 
Experience constitutes an important factor in 
delegation. A delegator is more likely to choose a 
candidate as a delegate if the delegate has prior 
experience of occupying that role. [22] identified 
two factors that contribute to experience. One factor 
is when the task was performed, and the second 
factor is how well the tasks were performed.  
The two factors above were refined to reflect 
subjects and roles attributes. That is, the period the 
subject occupies the role and his performance 
during his occupation of the role. For example, it 
will be better and more reasonable for an Head of 
department to delegate his role to a candidate who 
has occupies the position of an head of department 
before for the longest period of years and who is 
adjudged to have performed creditably. 
Performance values can take a value of 0 (non 
performer) or 1 (Satisfactorily Performance). 
Formally, experience based on trust can be 
formalized as follows; 
Let the performance period and performance values 
required of role 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  be defined as follows 
respectively: 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖
=  𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖1 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖2 , … , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑝𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛   
And  
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  1  
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Then, the expression below defined the Weight 
required for the occupation of role 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  of 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖 ; 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑊𝑔𝑡𝑖 =  (𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖  
where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
If  
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑘 ≠  ∅  
And 
 (𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑘) +
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑘
≥  (𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑃𝑓𝑚_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖  
where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. and 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
Then  
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                              𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
else 
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                                      𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
 
5.3 Formalizing “Recommendation” In 
Trust Modelling For Delegation Policy. 
Recommendations are the information that the 
truster obtains from reputable sources about the 
trustee. Recommendations in this context are 
provided from two other subjects whom the truster 
trust about the capabilities of the trustee. 
Formally, recommendation based on trust can be 
formalized as follows: 
Let 𝛽 be the minimum total values from two 
recommenders 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑧  and 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑗  required for 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖  to 
delegate his role 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  to 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  
Given the recommended values of 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘  from 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑧  
and 𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑗  as 
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑍 =
 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑧1 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑧2 , … , … , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑧𝑘  
And  
𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑗
=  𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑗1 , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑗2 , … , … , 𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑘   
respectively, 
if 
 (𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑧𝑘 ) +
𝑧𝑘
𝑧=1
 (𝑆𝑏𝑗_𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑘 )
𝑗𝑘
𝑗 =1
≥ 𝛽 
Then 
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                              𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
else 
𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒                                      𝑆𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∶  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑖  
 
From the above, the two major requirements have 
been considered from roles, objects and subjects’ 
attributes as pre-requisite condition for roles 
delegation in an open system for ease of security 
administration. The schematic architecture of the 
model is shown diagrammatically below. 
 
 
 
         
Figure 1.0: - Schematic Architecture of the Information Security Model Designed [18]
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DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT, RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
A typical University departmental organization was 
selected for the experimental design where the 
following major roles were identified and coded as 
follows; Head of department (HOD), Examination 
officer (EO), Undergraduate Lecturing (ULEC), 
Postgraduate Lecturing (PLEC), Examiners 
(EXAM), Post Graduate Programme Coordinator 
(PGPC), Post Graduate Diploma Coordinator 
(PGDC), Project Coordinator (PRJC), SIWES 
Coordinator (SIWC), Engineers (ENGR), 
Technologists (TECH), administrative staff 
(ADM), and Students (STD), PhD Supervisors 
(PHSV). Detail of the experiment was reported in 
[18]. 
 
 
The experimental results obtained from the simulation runs are as presented in the tables below: 
Table 1.0: Typical Experimental Result from Delegation Based on Separation of Duty 
Simulation Runs No of Successful 
Delegation 
No of Unsuccessful 
Delegation 
Total No of 
Process Initiated 
% of Success 
SR1. 1 14 15 6.67 
SR2. 3 12 15 20 
SR3. 1 14 15 6.67 
SR4. 1 14 15 6.67 
SR5. 0 15 15 0 
Total 6 69 75 % Average = 8 
 
 
Table 2.0: Typical Experimental Result from Delegation Based on Trust 
Simulation Runs No of Successful 
Delegation 
No of Unsuccessful 
Delegation 
Total No of 
Process Initiated 
% of Success 
SR1. 3 12 15 20 
SR2. 5 10 15 33.33 
SR3. 1 14 15 6.67 
SR4. 3 12 15 20 
SR5. 5 10 15 33.33 
Total 17 58 75 % Average = 
22.67 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.0: Percentage Success from Simulation Results for the delegation Models based SoD and Trust. 
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Results from the tables above show that percentage 
average of successful delegation based on separation of 
duty and trust from our experimental simulation runs 
were found to be 8% and 22.67% respectively. 
Separation of duty especially when both static and 
dynamic SoD principles are combined was found to 
play a relatively significant role in ensuring secure 
delegation processes based on the experimental result.  
Therefore, logically, the results as shown in Table 1.0 
revealed that it may be significantly effective in 
protecting system resources especially where 
confidentiality and integrity of the resources are to be 
ensured since only roles are separated. It generated a 
fairly low percentage of successes with the last 
returning a zero. The implication is the fact that, the 
same role that has been separated from a subject can be 
re assigned again to the subject from whom it was 
previously separated under another circumstances thus, 
it will expose the system vulnerabilities making it more 
secure.  
Trust models on the other hand also record a fairly low 
percentage average of success (22.67%). This may or 
may not be objective in assigning roles to subjects in 
the quest to access objects. Although, experience of 
subject in occupying a role may be significant in 
delegation, but the fact that the recommenders may be 
subjective in giving recommendations about the 
subjects may also make delegation based on trust to 
return fairly low percentage. 
6. Conclusion 
Delegation gives temporary privilege to one or more 
users so that critical tasks can be completed without 
breaching security policy. Previous works [1, 2, 3, 22, 
23, 24] showed that delegation is a complex problem to 
solve and is generally modelled separately from other 
administration requirements. The reason is that 
previous models were generally based on the RBAC 
(Role- Based Access Control) model which usually 
may not be secure enough to deal with all delegation 
requirements. 
We proposed two requirements as a pre-requisite 
condition for role delegation. These are Separation of 
Duty (SoD), and Trust. These requirements were used 
for designing the mathematical structures for the 
delegation model of the obligation policy. It is of the 
authors’ opinion that delegation of roles through 
decentralised administration and the specification of 
separation of duty and trust should bring about a 
stricter access control in information system security 
design based on the simulation results using formulated 
hypothetical data. 
Future works will include the formalization and the 
integration of appropriate models for various 
revocations methodologies after successful delegation, 
determination, analysis and resolution of policy(ies) 
conflicts and integration of appropriate authorization 
policy into the model to further refine and validate the 
delegation policy. 
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